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.Tho' an idle fiction has noefficacy, yet we find by experience, that the ideas of those objects, whichwe believe either are or will be existent, produce in a lesser degree the same effect with those impressions, which are immediately present tothe senses and perception.The effect, then, of belief is to raise up asimple idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a likeinfluence on the passions.This effect it can only have by making an ideaapproach an impression in force and vivacity.For as the different degreesof force make all the original difference betwixt an impression and anidea, they must of consequence be the source of all the differences in theeffects of these perceptions, and their removal, in whole or in part, thecause of every new resemblance they acquire.Wherever we can make anidea approach the impressions in force and vivacity, it will likewiseimitate them in its influence on the mind; and vice versa, where itimitates them in that influence, as in the present case, this must proceedfrom its approaching them in force and vivacity.Belief, therefore, since itcauses an idea to imitate the effects of the impressions, must make itresemble them in these qualities, and is nothing but a more vivid andintense conception of any idea.This, then, may both serve as anadditional argument for the present system, and may give us a notionafter what manner our reasonings from causation are able to operate onthe will and passions.As belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions, so thepassions in their turn are very favourable to belief; and not only suchfacts as convey agreeable emotions, but very often such as give pain, doupon that account become more readily the objects of faith and opinion.A coward, whose fears are easily awaken'd, readily assents to everyaccount of danger he meets with; as a person of a sorrowful andmelancholy disposition is very credulous of every thing, that nourisheshis prevailing passion.When any affecting object is presented, it givesthe alarm, and excites immediately a degree of its proper passion;especially in persons who are naturally inclined to that passion.Thisemotion passes by an easy transition to the imagination; and diffusingitself over our idea of the affecting object, makes us form that idea withgreater force and vivacity, and consequently assent to it, according to theprecedent system.Admiration and surprize have the same effect as theother passions; and accordingly we may observe, that among the vulgar,quacks and projectors meet with a more easy faith upon account of theirmagnificent pretensions, than if they kept themselves within the boundsof moderation.The first astonishment, which naturally attends theirmiraculous relations, spreads itself over the whole soul, and so vivifiesand enlivens the idea, that it resembles the inferences we draw fromexperience.This is a mystery, with which we may be already a little acquainted, and which we shall have farther occasion to be let into in theprogress of this treatise.After this account of the influence of belief on the passions, we shall findless difficulty in explaining its effects on the imagination, howeverextraordinary they may appear.'Tis certain we cannot take pleasure inany discourse, where our judgment gives no assent to those imageswhich are presented to our fancy.The conversation of those who haveacquir'd a habit of lying, tho' in affairs of no moment, never gives anysatisfaction; and that because those ideas they present to us, not beingattended with belief, make no impression upon the mind.Poetsthemselves, tho' liars by profession, always endeavour to give an air oftruth to their fictions; and where that is totally neglected, theirperformances, however ingenious, will never be able to afford muchpleasure.In short, we may observe, that even when ideas have nomanner of influence on the will and passions, truth and reality are stillrequisite, in order to make them entertaining to the imagination.But if we compare together all the phenomena that occur on this head,we shall find, that truth, however necessary it may seem in all works ofgenius, has no other effect than to procure an easy reception for theideas, and to make the mind acquiesce in them with satisfaction, or atleast without reluctance.But as this is an effect, which may easily besupposed to flow from that solidity and force, which, according to mysystem, attend those ideas that are established by reasonings fromcausation; it follows, that all the influence of belief upon the fancy maybe explained from that system.Accordingly we may observe, thatwherever that influence arises from any other principles beside truth orreality, they supply its place, and give an equal entertainment to theimagination.Poets have form'd what they call a poetical system of things,which tho' it be believ'd neither by themselves nor readers, is commonlyesteem'd a sufficient foundation for any fiction.We have been so muchaccustomed to the names of MARS, JUPITER, VENUS, that in the samemanner as education infixes any opinion, the constant repetition of theseideas makes them enter into the mind with facility, and prevail upon thefancy, without influencing the judgment
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