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.12On paper, therefore, it was possible to discern compelling reasons for improvement in both American-Soviet relations and American-Chinese relations.But politics are about people, not paper.For such changes to occur something approaching a psychological revolution was needed, or at least a tipping of the political balance in all three capitals against hard-line Cold Warriors.These domestic re-alignments, involving intricate maneuvers and power plays, were essential before any summit could take place.227reynolds_02.qxd 8/31/07 10:29 AM Page 228sum m i t sRichard Nixon had made his name in Congress as a dema-gogic anticommunist.His lead role in the hearings that exposed Alger Hiss as a Soviet agent helped catapult him to the rank of Eisenhower’s vice president.But then defeat by John Kennedy in the presidential election of 1960 apparently signalled the end of his political career.For a few years he returned to corporate law.But, modelling himself on Churchill (one of his heroes), he came back from the political wilderness to reach the pinnacle of power.The new Nixon was a self-styled realist, arguing that post-Vietnam America had to adapt to a more even distribution of worldpower.This meant burden-sharing with its allies—what becameknown as the Nixon Doctrine: “We cannot supply all the concep-tions and all the resources.”13 It also required, in his view, a new relationship with the Soviet empire, accepting that it was a fixture on the international scene.“After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation,” he declared in his inaugural address in January 1969.“Let all nations know that during this administration our lines of communication will be open.” Here was a new twist to Kennedy’s Cold Warrior rhetoric eight years before:“Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” By June 1963, sobered by the missile crisis, Kennedy spoke of “accommodation,” of helping “make the world safe for diversity”; in January 1969 Nixon asked Americans to “make the world safe formankind.” Both men had moved a long way from Woodrow Wil-son’s universalist slogan in 1917 about making the world “safe for democracy.”14Yet Nixon was still ready to apply America’s power with calcu-lated ruthlessness, as his secret bombing of Cambodia in 1969showed.And he had no doubt about the global superiority of the American way.Indeed he considered Wilson “our greatest President of this century” because he had the “greatest vision of America’s world role.” Wilson failed, insisted Nixon, because “he wasn’t practical enough.”15228reynolds_02.qxd 8/31/07 10:29 AM Page 229mo scow 1972A practical foreign policy, in Nixon’s judgment, required a strong, assertive presidency.However, America’s constitutional separation of powers left the president frequently at the mercy of Congress.Worse still, the country’s politicized bureaucracy and aggressive press made it hard to formulate a coherent policy and keep it confidential.Nixon therefore came to power convinced that he must conductforeign policy in maximum secrecy.His temperament pushed himin the same direction.An insecure loner with few close friends, he brooded obsessively on politics; he was convinced from bitter experience that “they” were out to get him and that he must therefore strike first.His copies of the daily White House news summaries were full of annotations such as “hit him,” “cut him,” “fight him.”16And, as a compulsive reader of history and political biography, he was determined to leave his mark on world affairs.This also seemed to require a centralization of power in the White House.As secretary of state, Nixon appointed his old law partner William Rogers.But this was purely a front.Nixon’s all-important advisor and collaborator was Henry Kissinger, a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany whose intellect and ambition won him a place on theHarvard faculty
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