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.Well beforehe began his presidential campaign, he had put himself on record as favoring the withdrawal of recognition of the Soviet Union, freedom for localmilitary commanders to use atomic weapons against the USSR Let s lobone into the men s room of the Kremlin, he had said the sale of FDR sTennessee Valley Authority, and abolition of the graduated income tax.During the New Hampshire primary campaign, he had urged that SocialSecurity be made voluntary, described welfare recipients as people withlow intelligence and little ambition, decried government interference inthe economy and Federal aid to education, defended his opposition to civilrights legislation, and advocated the bombing of North Vietnam.Democrats watching the rise of Goldwater s candidacy were gleeful. Itbegins to look as though the Republicans are really going on a Kamikazemission in November, ADA president John P.Roche wrote Bill Moyers inJune.On the eve of the Republican convention in July, Lou Harris releaseda national survey showing that on eight out of 10 issues facing the country,the American people feel they are in sharp disagreement with the Arizonasenator. But in 1964 conservative Republicans, who had seized control ofthe party machinery and assured Goldwater s nomination, were more interested in trumpeting their ideology than in winning an election.Goldwater s acceptance speech at the convention underscored his determination to make his campaign a choice not an echo. The speech wasnot a traditional appeal for conciliation and party unity but a preaching to 174 :: lyndon b.johnsonthe converted, a call to the faithful to stand with him against collectivism and Communism.There could be no compromising these goals. Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice!.Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue! Goldwater declared. My God, one reporter remarked, he s going to run as Barry Goldwater. Johnson and his closest advisers puzzled over how to react to Goldwa-ter s nomination.There was an impulse to see Goldwater s candidacy as absurd and the Republican party as conceding the election.It was difficult to believe that so right-wing a candidate, espousing such extreme viewson both domestic and foreign affairs, could marshal a significant challengeto a popular incumbent, as Johnson was in the summer of 1964.But taking nothing for granted, Johnson insisted on a tough, hard-driving campaign.He saw Goldwaterism as the outgrowth of long public unrest with Big Government, Big Spending,.and feeling that Washington doesn t understand our problems. He wanted to broaden theDemocratic party base by reaching out to Independents and Republicans.Though he would be his own campaign manager and insisted on involving everyone at the White House in the election, he intended initially toact presidential and avoid taking on Goldwater himself.:: the bobby problem Despite initial maneuvers against Goldwater and the Republicans, Johnson wasn t yet ready to focus his full attention on the fall campaign.Sinceearly in the year he had been wrestling with questions about who would behis running mate.Initial soundings indicated warm support for RobertKennedy.National polls showed Bobby holding a four-to-one edge overHubert Humphrey, his closest rival.Johnson felt frustrated and trapped by the prospect of having Kennedyon the ticket.It was an open secret that they disliked each other.Someone very close to Johnson told Alsop categorically that Johnson will neverunder any circumstances choose Robert Kennedy. Three weeks after JFK sdeath, Johnson himself had told Ken O Donnell: I don t want history tosay I was elected to this office because I had Bobby on the ticket with me.But I ll take him if I need him. Throughout the spring Johnson explored possible alternatives toKennedy as a running mate.Partly, this was an exercise in creating interestin what would otherwise be a cut and dried Democratic convention.First,Johnson floated Sargent Shriver s name.A Catholic, a member of theKennedy clan, Shriver seemed like a good substitute for Bobby.On con Landslide Lyndon :: 175sideration, however, Johnson rejected the idea.Shriver s presence on theticket would still have raised questions about LBJ s capacity to win on hisown.At the same time, Johnson considered Hubert Humphrey, EugeneMcCarthy, the junior senator from Minnesota, and Defense SecretaryRobert McNamara.Johnson wanted Kennedy to take himself out of therunning, but Bobby wouldn t do it.He had no illusion about Johnson swishes, nor did he find the job all that appealing.True, it would make himan heir apparent to the presidency, but it carried a price he didn t want topay, a Johnson Vice President would need to be a yes man who conformed to LBJ s every wish. Whoever he is, Johnson told people in 1964, I want his pecker.in my pocket. Knowing all this, Kennedy still wouldn t drop out of the race.The allureof the second spot as a stepping stone to the first remained, but there wasalso some satisfaction in making Johnson squirm.Even if Bobby didn t run,he wanted to be asked
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