[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.” A unifiedP1: FCW0521857449c10Printer: cupusbwCUNY475B/Rosefielde0 521 85744 9November 5, 200614:1228The Reconfiguration of National Wealth and PowerEurope as America’s partner would only increase global stability, he argues.But Mr.Prodi worries that Americans understand neither the value of a united Europe northe difficulty in securing that unity.“Their prevalent doctrine today is to have adivided Europe,” Mr.Prodi said of the United States.Meanwhile, Mr.Prodi says,Europeans are building something new and different.That may suit the United Statesjust fine, he acknowledged, because internal bickering keeps Europe from presentinga unified challenge to Washington’s foreign policy, as in the months before the recentIraq war.But Mr.Prodi argues that it is in the Americans’ long-term interest to havea united Europe that can share the political and economic costs of world affairs.“Look how difficult it is to invent a new policy for the postwar Iraq.” In any case,Mr.Prodi said, it will be “decades, not years” before Europe has a totally unitedforeign policy because “it will be the last piece of sovereignty the member states willpool together.”73It’s the delay in uniting Europe around a single foreign policy that givesAmerica such a long time to prepare its attitude toward European integrationand to pursue it.There will be a strong body of opinion in America that willwant to let Europe tell us what our policy should be.Via wishful thinking,Europe has a strong fifth column in America.Believers in wishful thinkingare not viewed as fifth columnists because we don’t think of Europe as anadversary.But as it unifies, and uses America as an opponent around whichto unite, then Americans who espouse the European viewpoint, a perspectiveintended to keep America in its place, will become suspect.There is no greater need for presidential leadership in American foreignpolicy than here.In our view American policy should be that we want theEuropean nations to pursue their own welfare as they see it, so long as theycross no adversarial threshold with us.We should not care whether theyprefer a loose confederation or a strong federation.Should they choose thelatter, we prefer that they not select us as the ogre against whom the Continentwill unite, lest this course unintentionally cross a threshold of antagonismthat cannot be reclaimed.Furthermore, we should support Britain in stayingoutside, should it so wish.And we should prepare, while endeavoring toavoid it, for a long-term rivalry that at some point might worsen into thepossibility of overt conflict.CHAPTER 10: KEY POINTSChina1.Chinese economic growth has been spectacular for two decades andChina is integrating itself into the global economic system.P1: FCW0521857449c10Printer: cupusbwCUNY475B/Rosefielde0 521 85744 9November 5, 200614:1Geopolitical Aspirations of the Nations2292.This achievement is attributable to the Chinese Communist Party’simprobable success in combining authoritarian discipline of labor,state ownership of enterprise – elements of the old command econ-omy – with massive foreign direct investment and significant elementsof leasehold profit-driven markets.3.The Chinese economy has a pronounced bias toward inequitable butrapid development.4.The current Chinese system will allow China to overtake America inthe next twenty years in terms of the dollar value of its gross domesticproduct, but inefficiencies or other state priorities will place a lowceiling on living standards.5.As is the Soviet Union, China is better positioned to be a great militarypower than an affluent nation.6.To global insecurity caused by its momentum toward becoming agreat power, China adds the distinct risk of internal instability.7.The Chinese already have scores of nuclear missiles that they assertcan hit America’s West Coast cities.8.The Chinese are rapidly modernizing their nuclear missile capabil-ity with the objective of bringing the entire United States into theirtargeting range.9.America must respond to this increasing Chinese threat.Russia1.In the period of the early 1990s, there was a major geopoliticalchange (the USSR broke up), but there was little or no change inRussia’s economic and governance systems.The required qualifica-tion is that economic and political control is less heavy handed thanbefore.2.Individuals have far greater autonomy over economic and politicalmatters that the leadership deems inessential.3.The contemporary Russian economy is a Muscovite authoritarianmixed system with weakly developed competitive institutions thatinvite corruption.4.Russia’s scuttling of the Communist Party–state control apparatus in1991 combined with Boris Yeltsin’s predilection for revenue misappro-priation and asset-grabbing by his favorites, prevented the emergenceof the rule of law and competitive markets, which might have pre-served full employment; furthermore, Yeltsin refused to devise newstate institutions to foster growth.P1: FCW0521857449c10Printer: cupusbwCUNY475B/Rosefielde0 521 85744 9November 5, 200614:1230The Reconfiguration of National Wealth and Power5.The consequence is that Russia has been stuck in an incomplete transi-tion from communism to free enterprise, which has resulted in 17 yearsof hyperdepression.6.There is now little likelihood that the Russian economy will success-fully manage a free enterprise transition, so that Russia will continueto decline economically relative to the other major powers.7.What Russia has done well in the past is to harness its economy to mil-itary preparedness, while providing only very weak consumer welfare.It is very likely to do this again.8
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]